

FROM THE RECORD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

STAFF CONFERENCE OF

UNITED STATES SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Present: Robert Morris, Chief Counsel, United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and Admiral Charles M. Cooke, U.S.N. (Retired).

Mr. Morris. What is your name, sir?

Admiral Cooke. Charles Maynard Cooke, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Mr. Morris. When did you retire, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. I retired in May, 1948.

Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has been, among other things, assessing the events of the last ten years in order to determine to what extent subversive forces may have set in motion those happenings. As a corollary of this inquiry, the Subcommittee observed that faulty intelligence as well as a disinclination on the part of certain government officials have been contributing factors to the decline of the United States' position in international affairs.

Admiral Cooke, you appeared before the Subcommittee on October 19, 1951, and you related at that time your personal experiences and observations as they bore on the inquiry that the Subcommittee was carrying on into the extent to which Communist forces were able to influence our foreign policy.

At this time, Admiral, we would like you to relate those experiences of yours which indicated that persons charged with the responsibility of shaping policy did not receive when it was available, or did not actively go forward to acquire intelligence that might have caused the outcome to have eventuated differently.

For instance, recently the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was told by Ambassador Angus Ward that, after he returned from some of his firsthand encounters with the aggressions of the Chinese Communists, not only was he discouraged from telling his story to the policy makers by his superiors, but that, in at least one instance, deception was used to prevent him from imparting the necessary information to the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral, you are a graduate of the United States Military Academy, are you not, sir?

Admiral Cooke. Naval Academy.

Mr. Morris. Naval Academy?

Admiral Cooke. Yes, 1910.

Mr. Morris. And you were Chief of Staff to Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet during the war, were you not, sir?

Admiral Cooke. Yes, I was Chief of Staff during the latter part of the war, but Chief Strategic Adviser practically during the entire war.

Mr. Morris. And in that capacity did you attend any of the international conferences?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. I attended all the international conferences held by the heads of the leading governments, beginning with Casablanca and ending with Potsdam.

Mr. Morris. Why don't you enumerate them? There are only four or five, aren't there?

Admiral Cooke. Oh, no.

Mr. Morris. Well, go ahead and name them.

Admiral Cooke. There are about eight of them, beginning with Casablanca, followed by Washington, two in Quebec, one in Cairo, one in Yalta and one at Potsdam. I think that's all.

- 2 -

Mr. Morris. And you attended those conferences as a Strategic Adviser to Admiral King; is that right, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Now, Admiral, during this period of time that you acted in that capacity, did you begin to be aware in your official military capacity of the looming threat of Soviet aggression?

Admiral Cooke. I became aware of the attitude and method of operations of Communists during the war and, with the approaching defeat of Japan and the build-up of the Russian Communist strength in Manchuria toward the end of the war, I recognized that a very serious situation would confront the United States, due to the fact that Japan, completely defeated, would provide a vacuum for Russian aggression after the war was over, and about April, 1945, a few months before the war was over, I gave Admiral King a memorandum setting forth this prospective situation in the Far East.

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, Admiral, did the Army also make a report on this threat?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. I learned later that the Intelligence Division of the Army had submitted a similar report in June of 1945.

Mr. Morris. What was your first assignment after the war, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. After the war I was assigned as Commander of the United States Seventh Fleet, then stationed in Chinese waters, and which came to include all of the United States combat forces in China during the period of 1946 on to the fall of China to the Communists.

Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in command of the Seventh Fleet?

Admiral Cooke. I was in command from the 8th of January, 1946, to the end of February, 1948.

Mr. Morris. Now, Admiral, I wonder if you would briefly state for us at this time the forces that, from your experience, contributed to the Soviet conquest of China.

Admiral Cooke. First I would say the build-up of Russian Communist power in Manchuria and North Korea, as a result of the Yalta Agreements and of the entry of Russia into the war against Japan about one week before Japan's surrender.

Second, I would say that the failure of the Russians to carry out the treaty agreements made by Communist Russia and Nationalist China about the 6th of August, 1945, which was in consummation of the agreement of the United States Government to undertake to cause the Chinese Nationalist government to comply with the agreements made at Yalta. In these agreements of the treaty, the Russian Communists agreed to give all of their support to the Nationalist Government of China. But when the war was over, on August 14th, and later, the Russians refused to permit the Chinese Nationalist forces to enter Manchuria through Manchurian ports to recover their sovereign territory.

This action provided a great help to the success of the Communist armies who were coming into Manchuria to be armed with Japanese and Russian equipment.

Third, even with this Russian Communist help, on two or three occasions the Chinese Communist movement was thwarted by the Nationalists, upon which occasions our representatives in China forced the Nationalists to agree to a truce.

Fourth, in August of 1946, because the Nationalists had not complied with all of the demands of the United States representatives in China who sought agreement between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist armies in rebellion against the Chinese government, the United States imposed a complete embargo against supplying ammunition and armed equipment to the Nationalist army, even denying ammunition for the American guns that certain Chinese divisions had been equipped with to fight the Japanese.

Mr. Morris. How long did that embargo last, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. Technically the embargo lasted for about ten months. Factually--

Mr. Morris. That was until when?

- 3 -

Admiral Cooke. Let's see. August, September. Until about May, 1947.

Factually it lasted much longer, because of the great delays that took place after the technical termination of the embargo. The effect of this embargo was set forth in an observation personally made to me by General Marshall in August or September of 1946; "that with the embargo we had in effect first armed the Chinese Nationalists and then disarmed them."

Five, the Russian Communists provided the Chinese Communists with operational advisers, organizers, thereby improving their fighting efficiency at the same time that the Nationalists were not receiving any such operational advisory assistance from the United States.

Sixth, the Nationalist armies had been fighting against Japan for eight years and had suffered heavy casualties during the period that the Communist armies had not been engaged.

Seventh, I should add that due to the lack of operational advice, badly needed by all Chinese armies, there was inept leadership on the part of the Nationalist commands.

Mr. Morris. After your tour of duty as Commander of the Seventh Fleet, did you retire from the Navy?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. I returned to the United States and passed to the retired list on the 1st of May, 1948.

Mr. Morris. What did you do then?

Admiral Cooke. Then I returned to my home in Sonoma, California.

Mr. Morris. What did you do when you first entered upon your retirement?

Admiral Cooke. I accepted speaking engagements in various parts of the United States, both in 1948 and 1949, and kept up my interest in the Far East situation, appearing in Washington on a number of occasions to talk to Members of Congress, both of the House of Representatives and the Senate, giving them such information that I had on the Far East. This kind of activity on my part was stepped up to a much higher degree after the Communist People's government was set up in Peking on October 1, 1949.

Mr. Morris. What did you do after October 1st, 1949, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. When the Communist government was set up in Peking, I knew that it was being done largely by the Soviet Communists. This was confirmed by the recognition of the Chinese Communist government by the U.S.S.R. two days later, on October 3, 1949.

I felt that this might likely lead to the recognition of Communist China by the United States government, which in turn would lead to the loss of Formosa to the Communists. I considered that if we recognized Red China we would soon lose Formosa, and if we lost Formosa we would certainly recognize Red China, and that both or either were very serious disasters to United States security and world freedom.

I therefore went to Washington and spent about two months in the Washington area, working in large degree with Mr. William Pawley, ex-Ambassador to Brazil, in an effort to set up a group of ex-United States Naval and Military officers and retired officers to go to Formosa to assist the Nationalist government in preventing the fall of Formosa to Communism.

I made formal recommendations to the State Department and informal recommendations to the President himself, through his aide, that this be carried out, but I never received any action one way or the other on these recommendations; no red light, no green light.

Finally, about the 1st of December of 1949, I discontinued my efforts and returned to Sonoma, California.

Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in Sonoma, California?

Admiral Cooke. On the 5th of January of 1950, when the President of the United States and the Secretary of State issued statements that the United States was not concerned with the fate of Formosa and that South Korea was also beyond the perimeter of United States strategic concerns, I called up Mr. Pawley in Washington from California to express my view that this could be very disastrous to the United

- 4 -

States, and every effort should be made to modify the government's decision, and I proceeded that night to Washington and talked with a number of senators, all of whom agreed, but none of them could do anything about it.

So I returned to my home in Sonoma, California.

Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, in either of these two visits to Washington that you just related, were there reports circulating that the island of Formosa, containing as it did the Chinese government, was about to fall?

Admiral Cooke. While I was in Washington, during the period of October and November of 1949, I saw reports, or copies of reports which had been sent by the United States Consul-General in Taipei, Formosa, stating in effect that Formosa would fall to the Communists within a period of one or two weeks from the date of the dispatch report. I knew that we did not at that time have any Naval Intelligence representatives in Formosa, and I felt that these reports were not well-founded. In fact, I was sure that they were not correct.

I did not at that time take any action to inquire into the reports, as I felt that they were probably of a confidential nature. But I felt the urge myself to get to Formosa somehow or another, in order to find out how correct or incorrect they really were.

Mr. Morris. Well, Admiral, were these reports, in your opinion, causing damage?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. I considered that they were causing a very serious adverse effect on the United States policy and action. I found that many of the people in the government to whom I presented the idea that we should help the Formosa Nationalist government hold on to Formosa against Communist attack were undoubtedly influenced by these reports of a debacle in Formosa that would be forthcoming in the very early future.

I did not immediately, at that time, know that our State Department was getting ready to warn all diplomatic personnel throughout the world to be ready to explain the fall of Formosa, a warning that was actually issued, as I remember it, just about the time of my departure from Washington on the 3rd of December of 1949.

Mr. Morris. Did the warning itself have an adverse effect?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. I considered that it did in a very high degree, because the Nationalist government, just having been driven off the mainland, was in somewhat of a precarious position in Formosa, with particular regard to its relationship with all the countries in the world, some of which would be ready to recognize Communist China without delay.

In other words, if this warning of the State Department was supported by certain things going badly in Formosa, there was a great chance that the recognition of Red China at this time might become fairly worldwide.

Mr. Morris. Did you go to Formosa and, if so, in what capacity?

Admiral Cooke. After going to Washington the 6th of January, 1950, and not accomplishing very much to save the situation as I thought it needed to be saved, I felt the need to go to Formosa to see for myself the actual situation and, further, to see what I, at least, could do about helping hold this island.

I therefore arranged with the International News Service for an accreditation representing them in Formosa and obtained a passport for that purpose and proceeded to Formosa, leaving the United States on the 1st of February, 1950, passing through Tokyo and Hong Kong and arriving in Formosa on the 11th of February, 1950.

Mr. Morris. When you arrived in Formosa, Admiral, did you find that we had adequate intelligence representation on the island?

Admiral Cooke. No, I did not. When I was passing through Tokyo, I talked to the commander of our Seventh Fleet, then in Yokosuka, who had the same intelligence about the situation in Formosa as I had seen in Washington, and from whom I learned that no Naval Intelligence representatives were in Formosa.

When I arrived in Formosa, I found that there were no intelligence representatives from MacArthur's staff, from the War Department, from the Navy Department or from the Central Intelligence Agency, then in Formosa. The only official intelligence representatives were the attaches, Army, Navy, Air Force, all of them, of course, under the State Department representative, Mr. Robert Strong, Consul-General, with the position of Charge d'Affaires.

- 5 -

Mr. Morris. Admiral, if Navy Intelligence or General MacArthur's Headquarters had wanted to send intelligence personnel to Formosa, could they have done so?

Admiral Cooke. So far as I know, they could not. About March of 1950, possibly in April, General Fortier, who was No. 2 in the G-2 organization of General MacArthur, desired to come to Formosa to learn at first hand what the real situation was. His request was turned down and later he made a trip to Southeast Asia, and in particular to Indo-China, and returned, taking passage on a plane that stopped at Taipei, Formosa, and he stopped over for a few days.

This action on his part was objected to, I was informed, by the United States Consul-General, Mr. Strong. I do not know, of course, all the details of what transpired between General Fortier and Mr. Strong, but I believe that General Fortier has appeared before your Committee.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, after you arrived on Formosa, did you, in fact, find the situation to coincide with the situation reported by the Consul-General, the reports you had read in Washington and in Tokyo?

Admiral Cooke. No, they did not. Also I found in Formosa that a number of people were familiar with the reports that had been made. This put me in a position to refer to them because I found that they were no longer confidential. I did not find anything in Formosa which supported the reports made in October and November of 1949, setting forth, as they did, the imminence of the fall of Formosa to Communism with a period of two or three weeks.

I also learned that, in December of 1949, the State Department representation in Formosa had warned all Americans to leave Formosa because of this imminent fall; that some had done so, but others had stayed on.

I also was informed that one of the assistant military attaches, Captain J. R. Manning, had wished to report facts which did not fit in with the character of reports apparently desired by the State Department representation, and who therefore made a direct report to the War Department.

Further, I was informed that Captain Manning had been summarily detached from his duty as Assistant Military Attache and sent to the U. S. Command in Tokyo.

Some weeks later, while in Tokyo, I looked up Captain Manning, and he confirmed the report about this incident that I had received while in Formosa.

Mr. Morris. That would appear, would it not, Admiral, to be an example of policy shaping intelligence reports, rather than policy following facts revealed by Intelligence?

Admiral Cooke. I would rather put it this way: As it appeared to me, there was a policy that had been set up in Washington by the United States government and which was being followed by the State Department representatives in Formosa, which required that Intelligence facts should conform to the policy rather than have a change of policy that would be guided by the facts.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, were there more episodes and instances of which you learned while you were on Formosa that were being inadequately reported through our representatives there?

Admiral Cooke. Yes, there were. But, in order to give an adequate answer to your question, it is necessary that I relate what happened, first, with regard to the fall of Hainan to the Communists in April of 1950, and, second, of the Nationalist evacuation of the Chusan Archipelago in May of 1950.

When I returned from Tokyo in the middle of April, 1950, I found that the Communists had landed in strength in Hainan. This landing in strength followed a number of guerilla landings from the mainland on Hainan during the months of February and March. I was informed by President Chiang Kai-shek that it had been intended to evacuate Hainan in February, because it was 700 miles from Formosa, because the troops there were not too well trained and equipped and because no more troops, naval ships and aircraft could be spared to Hainan from the defense of the Chusan Archipelago and Formosa itself.

However, he went on to add that this evacuation had been delayed because the Nationalist forces were still fighting Communists in Sikang, a province to the west of Yunan, and the communications by air between Sikang and Formosa had to be routed through Hainan. I suggested to the President that it would be desirable to repel this Communist invasion if possible and afterwards to evacuate it while not under pressure.

- 6 -

With this view, he agreed. I volunteered to go down to Hainan with his Chiefs of Staff and give them any advice that I could, and I did go down, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

A few days after my arrival in Hainan, the Communist armies overthrew the Nationalist armies, and I flew back to Formosa. Admiral Kwei, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Navy, stayed in the Hainan area and succeeded in removing practically all of the Nationalist troops, preventing their capture by the Communists.

The representative of the Associated Press, also in Hainan at the time of its fall, and probably misled by certain of the generals who had failed in Hainan, reported in an AP release that President Chiang Kai-shek had himself engineered the debacle. This press release was of a character that would cause serious damage to the cause of the Nationalist government and was, as I knew, completely unfounded.

When I returned to Taipei, I asked all of the naval and military attaches to come to my place, in order that I could relate to them what had happened. I told them that whereas the performance of the Nationalist forces in Hainan was not creditable, it did not carry with it the venal aspects reported in the AP dispatch. The attaches accepted this report.

I also wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, reporting what had taken place.

In addition to the above, I reported that I had questioned the Chinese, both on the ships and on the planes, about the ammunition that had been directed toward the ships and Nationalist aircraft from the mainland across the Ten-Mile Strait from Hainan and had reached the conviction that the Communists, probably including Russians as well as Chinese, were using proximity fuses in their ammunition.

Mr. Morris. What were proximity fuses, Admiral?

Admiral Cooke. A proximity fuse was developed very secretly by the United States in World War II and is sometimes called an "influence fuse", which causes the ammunition to be detonated without striking a material object, but merely passing near to it.

Mr. Morris. Of what significance was it to you, Admiral, that the Communists were using proximity fuses?

Admiral Cooke. This fuse, developed by the United States Navy in World War II, was at that time of such a secret character that our forces on land did not use it against the Germans because it was feared that the secret might be discovered by the recovery of unexploded ammunition.

Therefore, I reached the conviction that this was no longer a secret; that the Russians had probably had it for some time; that the Russians were supplying it to the Chinese Communist armies and that probably Russian personnel themselves were participating in the Liuchow Peninsula, just across the Strait from Hainan, against the Nationalist ships and planes.

The information of the rather discreditable performance of the Nationalist forces in Hainan seemed to be received by the attaches with an acquiescing reception. However, a different reception was accorded to the reports that I furnished them after the evacuation of the Chusan Archipelago, which is about 350 miles north of Formosa, just off the Chinese Coast and near the port of Hangchow. The Nationalist government regarded, properly in my opinion, the holding of Chusan as very important to their strategical security, because Chusan would flank any amphibious movement in strength mounted in the Yangtze River.

Therefore, they had a strong defensive force stationed in Chusan, of about 125,000 men. They had had an important battle in October of 1949, in which they had repelled further advance at that time of the Communist Armies against the rest of the archipelago.

But in April of 1950, photographs taken by Chinese Nationalist planes established the fact that Russian jet planes were flying from air fields around Shanghai. By this time the Communists had established 14 air fields in the Shanghai-Hangchow area, from which air strikes could be delivered against Nationalist forces in the Chusan area. The Nationalists had only one air field in Chusan.

Further, the Communists had between two and 400,000 troops in the same area, available for attack against Chusan. It was evident to me that, if the Chinese Communists and their Russian components decided to attack Chusan, they should be able to take it. Approved For Release 2004/06/23 : CIA-RDP58-00597A000200140030-4
I felt that a strong possibility existed miles away from the Nationalist positions.

- 7 -

of such an attack taking place during the summer, June, July or August. I felt that if such an attack took place, not only would Chusan be lost, but the Nationalist strength would be so depleted that Formosa itself probably could not be held. Remember that at this time, early May, 1950, the U. S. government disclaimed any interest in the fate of Formosa.

I therefore recommended that Chusan be evacuated before such an attack. The decision was made by President Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers on the 9th of May, to evacuate, and the evacuation was completed by the 16th of May. All the forces and equipment on Chusan were successfully removed and returned to Formosa without any casualties and without any Communist interference by air or otherwise. The evacuating forces had difficulties because of swift currents amongst the Chusan islands, and fog.

I therefore flew up to give assistance during the last two days, accompanying the Chinese Naval Commander, Admiral Kwei. I therefore was fully informed as to the plans of the operation and of the final steps in the completion of the evacuation. The secret of this move was so well kept that it did not become known to the Communists, nor to those in Formosa not concerned with carrying it out. It was therefore very much to my surprise when, about the 17th of May, I was informed that our attaches had the information that many Nationalist troops had been killed by Communist gunfire, many troops had been left behind, much equipment had been lost and that a serious debacle had taken place.

It was also stated that the Island of Quemoy, or Kinmen as called by the Chinese, had been evacuated and that the Pescadores Islands had been ordered evacuated. The garrison of Kinmen Island at that time was from 60 to 70,000 men.

The attaches and others associated with them in United States government circles had also stated that Formosa would fall in June and not later than July, that is, within less than two months. These assertions of facts and of views first transpired in a secret meeting and were transmitted to me by someone who had learned of them. I immediately asked the attaches to join me at my headquarters. I informed them that I had been in the Chusan area on the last two days of the evacuation; that no debacle had taken place; that the Communists were not aware that the evacuation was taking place; that no troops and no equipment had been left behind and that all troops were being returned to Formosa.

I further informed them that Kinmen had not been evacuated and was not being evacuated, and, further, that there was no intention to evacuate the Pescadores. To this the attaches replied that their information and their informants were of a character they were sure that they were right and that I was wrong.

In spite of all of my assurances that I had personally witnessed what had taken place in Chusan and that they would find that Kinmen had not been evacuated, they insisted on retaining their own view and so reported, I gather, to Washington.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, were all of these attaches under the direction of Mr. Robert Strong?

Admiral Cooke. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Is he still in the State Department?

Admiral Cooke. After his being relieved in August of 1950, he proceeded to the State Department and I heard that he was in the State Department in 1952. Since then I do not know.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, had you finished that last episode when I interrupted?

Admiral Cooke. No, I had not finished.

To go on with the report to Washington of what had taken place in the middle of May in Chusan and Kinmen and the Pescadores, I wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, relating in detail what had happened, stating that I considered the whole Chusan operation to be very creditable to the Nationalist government, but that the attaches had not accepted my reports and I was therefore sending them direct to the Chief of Naval Operations.

However, I knew that my report, being made by myself, who was in an unofficial status, would not be accepted in the face of the strong official report coming in from the attaches and the Consul-General. I therefore wrote separate letters to Senator Knowland and Congressman Walter Judd, relating what had taken place. In my view it was necessary to counteract the very serious deterioration in the position of the Nationalist government.

- 8 -

I was convinced then, as the United States government has since become convinced, that the security of Formosa to the free world was of vital importance to the United States. It is to be borne in mind that the Communist attack on South Korea had not yet taken place.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, were there any other episodes?

Admiral Cooke. Yes. A day or two after my conference, let me say abortive conference, with the attaches, all Americans were warned to leave Formosa, and all the women in United States government employ in Formosa were ordered to leave, and were given the choice of going either to Seoul in Korea or to Saigon in Indo-China. Seoul was to be attacked and taken by the North Korean Communists about one month later, and Saigon was the scene of frequent bombings by Communist underground elements in that city. I had hoped to forestall this blow to the Nationalist government of ordering Americans to leave, or warning them to leave for the second time in five months.

The facts as related by me to the attaches and to the U. S. Navy Department were, of course, all borne out. The troops and equipment from Chusan did arrive. Kinmen or Quemoy is still occupied by Nationalist troops.

Now it seemed evident to me after these two incidents, that of Hainan and that of Chusan, had taken place and the facts had been related by me, an Admiral of the U. S. Navy, retired, in detail as of one who was present in each case, that the attaches accepted the report on Hainan which reflected discredit on the Nationalist government and rejected completely the report on Chusan which reflected great credit on the Nationalist government. There seemed to be a confused distortion and appraisal of certain strategic aspects of the general situation.

For instance, the Naval attache attached to Consul-General Strong's staff, informed me that Chusan should not have been evacuated; that it should have been held by the Nationalists. He had further stated that Chusan did not have more than 60,000 troops in that area, but he strongly asserted his view that the Communists, with many squadrons including jet aircraft, and with several hundred thousand troops, could not take Chusan, some places only two miles distant from Communist-held adjacent islands.

At the same time, in defense of the order for Americans to leave Formosa, he stated that the Communists crossing a 100-mile strait could take Formosa with one LST.

Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, to your knowledge has anything been done to correct the defective intelligence situation which you have described here today?

Admiral Cooke. I have read about the task force formed under the Hoover Commission, the task force headed by General Clark, which I believe went into the Intelligence situation exhaustively, but I believe that very little, if any, of the report was ever published. I myself, in October of 1951, was asked to talk to the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency by General Bedell Smith, who was then head, to convey to him the Formosan situation, while I was in Washington after testifying before your Committee and before my return to Formosa. I gave General Smith and his assistants most of the facts that I have related to you herein.

More recently, about last January, I learned that the President had appointed a permanent or continuing commission to watch over the Intelligence activities, consisting of six or eight people, and headed by the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mr. Killian. I wrote to the Navy Member of this Commission immediately, to tell him that I could bear witness to some very serious failures in Intelligence that had caused great harm to the United States, and would like to appear before this committee. When this offer, originally made in January, was not accepted, I repeated it several months later, but I have now come to the conclusion that the Commission is not interested in hearing what I have to say.

Mr. Morris. Admiral, you have pointed out here for the record some serious failures on the part of Intelligence in the past. What do you think should be done about them, in order to insure the internal security of the United States?

Admiral Cooke. It seems to me that there is a possibility, a serious possibility, that the future may bring others who will, in pursuance of a policy, be ready to twist facts, head off facts, deny information to other members of the government and to the people which can endanger the security of the United States. The need to provide against such possibilities apparently was felt about atomic energy.

So not only was a commission of 2004/06/23 : CIA-RDP58-00597A000200140030-4 which could scarcely be liable to go off on such tangents. I think, therefore, that the

- 9 -

Security Council of the United States should include a full-time committee composed of able military officers of each service, perhaps those nearing the retirement age, or just past the retirement age, and of representatives of the State Department who would be furnished a command ship which would permit them to visit critical areas such as the Far East, or the Mediterranean, acquaint themselves with the local situation, the local intelligence, and report then back to the Security Council, including the President, of course, and to the Defense Department.

Further, to insure that such a committee should not at any time be composed of those who would conform to an adopted theory of policy, that a committee of Congress similar to the Atomic Energy Commission should be established.

Mr. Morris. On behalf of the Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, I wish to thank you for the very important information and the very well-informed views you have presented here today.

* * * * *